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I. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
A. Status as the Consumer
HE question of who qualifies as a consumer represents one of the
most frequently litigated issues under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices--Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). I Courts have consist-
ently held that only those with standing as a consumer 2 can bring suit under
the DTPA.3 The Texas Supreme Court and courts of appeals considered the
issue of standing on several occasions during this Survey period.
In Sherman Simon Enterprises v. Lorac Service Corp.4 an employee of
Lorac Service Corporation rented a car from Sherman Simon Enterprises,
Inc. (SSE), a car rental franchisee. The employee used a company credit
card and billed the charges to the parent company of Lorac. While driving
the vehicle, the employee was involved in a collision that killed a passenger
in another car. Representatives of the deceased's estate brought suit against
Lorac. Ultimately, Lorac made a cash settlement with the estate. Lorac
brought suit under the DTPA against SSE seeking reimbursement for the
money paid to the estate. Lorac alleged that SSE, through the car rental
agreement, had misrepresented to Lorac that Lorac's employee had received
liability insurance coverage. The defendant rental car company responded
that Lorac, the employer, did not qualify as a consumer because Lorac could
not prove that SSE either billed Lorac or received payment from Lorac for
the rental car. The Texas Supreme Court rejected SSE's argument.5
* B.A., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Bragg, Smithers & Curry,
Austin, Texas. Adjunct Professor of Law, The University of Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987) [hereinafter
DTPA].
2. The DTPA defines consumer as:
an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of
this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services,
except that the term does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25
million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with
assets of $25 million or more.
3. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. 1980); accord Flenniken v.
Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983); Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc.,
618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981).
4. 724 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. 1987).
5. Id. at 15-16.
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The court began its analysis by applying the DTPA consumer standing
test6 originally set forth in Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc. 7 The Cameron
court required the plaintiff to show:
(1) The plaintiff sought or acquired goods or services by purchase
or lease; and
(2) The goods or services purchased or leased formed the basis of
the complaint.8
The Sherman court noted that the statutory definition of consumer includes
those plaintiffs who merely seek to acquire goods or services.9 The Sherman
court, therefore, did not require Lorac to prove payment. 10 The Sherman
court also noted that the lower court properly held that Lorac, through the
agency of its employee, had sought to acquire goods and services."
Although not discussed by the court, the facts indicate that the service of
providing insurance coverage for the vehicle apparently formed the basis of
the plaintiff's complaint, thereby satisfying the second prong of the test.
In Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital 12 a minor's parents sued on
their daughter's behalf to recover damages to her caused by hospital person-
nel, who improperly administered supplemental oxygen to her shortly after
her birth. The parents sued on theories of negligence and deceptive trade
practices. 13 The hospital contended, on appeal, that the infant did not qual-
ify as a consumer. The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument and
reaffirmed that the court defines a consumer in terms of his or her relation-
ship to a transaction, rather than by his or her relationship to the defend-
ant. 14 The infant acquired goods and services furnished by the hospital and
thereby established her standing for purposes of the DTPA.I5
The supreme court's opinions in Sherman and Birchfield, paralleled its
1985 decision in Kennedy v. Sale. 16 The Kennedy court held that the con-
sumer himself does not have to pay or intend to pay for the goods and serv-
ices in question. 17 The consumer, instead, must only acquire or seek to
acquire the goods or services in a transaction undertaken for his benefit.' 8
The fact that Lorac and the infant did not actually pay for the services they
received did not disqualify them as consumers. 19
6. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
7. 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981).
8. Id. at 539.
9. Sherman, 724 S.W.2d at 15.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 36 (Oct. 28, 1987).
13. Id. at 39.
14. Id. at 40 (citing Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.
1983) (relationship to transaction relevant to consumer standing)).
15. Id.
16. 689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985).
17. Id. at 892.
18. Id. at 892-93. Kennedy involved a suit by an employee complaining that an insurance
agent misrepresented the terms of a group health insurance policy for which the employerpaid.19. Id. at 892. In Berquist v. Onisiforou, 731 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ), the seller of a mineral interest brought suit against her real estate agent
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Challenge Transportation, Inc. v. J-Gem Transportation, Inc.20 involved a
DTPA claim by the lessee of three tractor trailers. The defendant contended
that the plaintiff lacked the required consumer status necessary to bring a
claim under the DTPA. Specifically, the defendant contended that the
plaintiff had the burden of proving that the plaintiff did not fall within the
class of businesses specifically excluded from the definition of consumers in
section 17.45(4).21 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the plaintiff
carried its burden of proof by proving that it was a corporation that had
acquired services by lease. 22 The court determined that the defendant
should plead the exceptions as an affirmative defense and, therefore, bear the
burden of proof on that issue.23
The Fifth Circuit considered the issue of consumer standing twice during
the Survey period. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Munn 24 involved a
suit by Munn, the guarantor of a loan, against Southwest Bank, the lender.
Munn alleged that the lender's deceptive trade practices and unconscionable
conduct induced him to sign the guarantee agreement. The bank argued on
appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction asking
whether the bank agreed to render services to Munn, in addition to ex-
tending credit to him. The Fifth Circuit held that although the plaintiff's
status as a consumer is ordinarily a question of law for the court, if the
parties dispute one of the elements necessary to establish standing as a con-
sumer, that element should be submitted to the jury.25 The court concluded
that the transaction primarily involved the extension of credit and that this
fact alone would not bring the transaction within the ambit of the DTPA.26
The appellate court, however, also found a fact issue as to whether the de-
fendant's misconduct was based on the rendition of a service other than the
extension of credit.27 The court remanded the cause to the trial court be-
cause conflicting evidence on this issue required the trial court to submit this
issue to the jury. 28 The Fifth Circuit followed its decision in Munn in the
case of Nottingham v. General American Communications Corp. 29 In Not-
and the buyer alleging that the agent's misrepresentations concerning the value of her mineral
interests caused her to sell the interests for less than their true worth. The seller further al-
leged that the buyer and her agent engaged in a civil conspiracy against her. The court held
that the plaintiff/seller was not a consumer because she sold rather than purchased the goods
that formed the basis of her complaint. Id. at 580. One could argue that the plaintiff was
complaining about the services of the agent, for which she had paid a commission. She could,
therefore, be considered a purchaser and a consumer. The opinion, however, did not state
whether the plaintiff framed her case in this manner.
20. 717 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Challenge Transp., 717 S.W.2d at 117.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 804 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1986).
25. Id. at 865-66.
26. Id. In Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980), the supreme court
held that the "mere" extension of credit did not qualify as a service covered by the DTPA.
27. Munn, 804 F.2d at 865-66. The court recognized that a service other than the exten-
sion of credit constituted an objective of the transaction. Id
28. Id.
29. 811 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1987).
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tingham the Fifth Circuit held that the DTPA covered services rendered in
connection with the sale of a security when an objective of the transaction
consisted of the receipt of those services.30
B. Liability Under the Act: General Considerations
In Home Savings Association v. Guerra31 a home owner sued to recover
damages for defects in home siding that Modem Builders had installed. The
homeowner had executed a promissory note that Modem Builders had as-
signed to Home Savings. The homeowner brought suit against both Modem
Builders and Home Savings and recovered a judgment against both defend-
ants, jointly and severally, for the sum of $25,000 plus attorneys' fees. At
the time of trial, Guerra had made retail installment payments totalling
$1,256.90. On appeal Homes Savings denied liability, pursuant to a Federal
Trade Commission rule,3 2 for any amount in excess of the amount paid on
the note. A unanimous Texas Supreme Court agreed with Home Savings
and reversed the court of appeals. 33
First, the court explained that the FTC rule preserves the consumer's
claims and defenses against the assignee-creditor and thereby makes the
buyer's duty to pay dependant upon the seller's duty to perform properly. 34
The court emphasized that the FTC-required notice explicitly limits the
amount that the note holder must pay to the amount that the consumer paid
under the contract. 35 Second, the court held that any construction of the
FTC rule that would impose derivative liability on the creditor in an amount
greater than the amount the consumer paid would transform the creditor
into an "absolute insurer or guarantor of the seller's performance." 36 Signif-
icantly, the court acknowledged that the FTC rule merely limits a creditor's
derivative liability for the seller's conduct and does not limit a consumer's
right to recover against a creditor on independent grounds under state law.37
In Guerra, however, the consumer did not obtain a jury finding that Home
30. Id. at 878.
31. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 534 (July 1, 1987).
32. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1976). The FTC rule provides in part:
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or services to consumers, in or
affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission
Act, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of Section 5
of that Act for a seller, directly or indirectly to:
(a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to contain the fol-
lowing provision in at least ten point, bold type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUB-JECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES
OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS
HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT
EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
Id..
33. Guerra, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 534-35.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 535.
36. Id. at 534-35.
37. Id. at 535.
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Savings had committed a deceptive or unconscionable act.38 No independ-
ent basis existed, therefore, to impose liability on the creditor.39 The court
distinguished its prior opinion in Knight v. International Harvester Credit
Corp.4° on the grounds that the creditor-assignee's involvement in Knight
exceeded the creditor's involvement in the present case. 41 In addition, the
creditor in Guerra had not pleaded or submitted the inextricably intertwined
theory of recovery discussed in Knight.42 The plaintiff's failure to establish
an independent ground of recovery limited Home Savings' liability to the
amounts the homeowner paid.4 3
In Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital" the plaintiff accused the
defendant hospital of committing deceptive trade practices in connection
with medical services rendered to the plaintiff in 1974. The hospital argued
that article 4590i, section 12.01, 4 5 although not effective until 1977, evi-
denced a legislative intent to exclude health care providers from the DTPA's
coverage. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that nothing in the pre-1977
DTPA illustrated a legislative intent to exempt health care providers from
liability under the DTPA.46
In a decision of potentially major consequence, the Texas Supreme Court
ruled in E F Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood 47 that the DTPA did not apply to
securities transactions. The court followed a three-step analysis in reaching
this conclusion. 48 First, the court observed that the DTPA provides strict
liability for misrepresentations, regardless of whether the speaker knows or
should know that the representation is false.4 9 The Texas Security Act50
(TSA) protects a party who misrepresents facts provided that the party exer-
cises due diligence in ascertaining the material's truth. 51 The court therefore
concluded that the two statutes were fundamentally inconsistent.52 Second,
the court reasoned that because the legislature added the due diligence de-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982). The court held that the seller and the note holder were
"so inextricably intertwined in the transaction as to be equally responsible for the conduct of
the sale." Id. at 389.
41. Guerra, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 536.
42. Id.
43. Id. But see Colonial Leasing Co. v. Kinerd, 733 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court held that (1) jury finding that two defendants acted together
insufficient to show that defendants "inextricably intertwined" and (2) concept of inextricably
intertwined pertains only to question of standing and does not provide basis for imposition of
derivative liability).
44. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 36 (Oct. 28, 1987).
45. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 12.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
46. Birchfield, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 39-40.
47. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 508 (June 24, 1987), withdrawn, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 65 (Nov. 10,
1987).
48. E.F Hutton, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 509-510.
49. Id. at 509; see Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. 1980) (liability
imposed for intentional and unintentional misrepresentations).
50. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581 (Vernon 1986).
51. Due diligence requires that a party not know and not reasonably be able to know of
the inaccuracy of the information.
52. EF Hutton, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 510.
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fense to the TSA four years after enacting the DTPA, the DTPA should not
apply to securities transactions. 53 Third, the court ruled that when faced
with two inconsistent statutes that deal with the same subject matter, the
court would apply the more specific statute.54 Finding that the Securities
Act dealt more directly with securities than did the DTPA, the court con-
cluded that the DTPA should not apply to securities transactions. 55 The
court, however, withdrew its opinion on a motion for rehearing. 56 The sub-
stitute opinion did not reach the question of the DTPA's applicability to
securities transactions because the parties did not properly preserve this
point for review. 57
The court's reasoning in the original Hutton opinion is difficult to follow.
First, just because the two statutes provide different thresholds for recovery
and different remedies does not render them fundamentally inconsistent;58
compliance with the more stringent standard in one statute will constitute
compliance with the less exacting standards in the other statute.59 Further-
more, both statutes provide that their remedies are cumulative, not exclu-
sive.6° Therefore, the availability of different or greater remedies under one
statute does not thereby impliedly restrict the remedies available under the
other statute. Further, the rule invoked by the court that a later enacted
statute restricts a prior inconsistent statute6 actually supports the conclu-
sion that the DTPA, not the TSA, controls. The legislature reenacted




56. E.F. Hutton, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 65 (Nov. 10, 1987).
57. Id.
58. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988) deals specifically with
fraud in the sale of stock, provides different remedies from those available under the Texas
Security Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581 (Vernon 1986). Under the court's analysis,
this provision would be fundamentally inconsistent.
59. A party who meets the strict liability standard by avoiding misrepresentations will
obviously meet the due diligence standard as well.
60. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (permits cumulative
remedies); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33M (Vernon Supp. 1988) (allows all com-
mon law and statutory actions outside Texas Securities Act to remain intact).
61. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.025(a) (Vernon 1988): "Except as provided by
section 311.031(d), if statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are
irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment prevails."
62. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Section 17.43 provides:
The provisions of this subchapter are not exclusive. The remedies provided in
this subchapter are in addition to any other procedures or remedies provided for
in any other law; provided, however, that no recovery shall be permitted under
both this subchapter and another law of both actual damages and penalties for
the same act or practice. A violation of a provision of law other than this sub-
chapter is not in and of itself a violation of this subchapter. An act or practice
that is a violation of a provision of law other than this subchapter may be made
the basis of an action under this-subchapter if the act or practice is proscribed by
a provision of this subchapter or is declared by such other law to be actionable
under this subchapter. The provisions of this subchapter do not in any way




TSA's due diligence defense. The DTPA, therefore, should control. Finally,
although the predecessor statute to the DTPA contained an exemption that
included securities transactions, the legislature repealed this exemption with
passage of the DTPA.63 Section 17.49 contains the only exemptions to the
Act and includes no exemption for persons dealing in securities. 64 Clearly,
services rendered in connection with the sale of securities are not exempt
from the DTPA.65
C. Warranty
In Coulson v. Lake LBJ Utility District 66 the court addressed the issue of
which party in a contract action bears the burden of proving the breach of an
implied standard of care and conduct. 67 The question arose when an engi-
neer sued the utility district seeking payment for engineering services. The
utility district defended by asserting that the engineer's preparation of the
plans and specifications failed to meet the standard of reasonable engineering
practice and that the engineer did not complete the plans in a good and
workmanlike manner. The court of appeals held that the engineer had the
burden of proving that he had met the accepted professional standards in
order to recover under the contract. 68 The Texas Supreme Court reversed. 6
9
The supreme court stated that the engineer's proof that he had complied
with the express terms of the contract created a rebuttable presumption that
he had performed the work in a good, workmanlike, and non-negligent man-
ner.70 Accordingly, the court held that a party who relies upon the defense
that the plaintiff failed to render services in a skillful manner carries the
63. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 17.49 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Section 17.49 provides:
(a) Nothing in this subehapter shall apply to the owner or employees of a
regularly published newspaper, magazine, or telephone directory, or broadcast
station, or billboard, wherein any advertisement in violation of this subchapter is
published or disseminated, unless it is established that the owner or employees
of the advertising medium have knowledge of the false, deceptive, or misleading
acts or practices declared to be unlawful by this subchapter, or had a direct or
substantial financial interest in the sale or distribution of the unlawfully adver-
tised good or service. Financial interest as used in this section relates to an
expectation which would be the direct result of such advertisement.
(b) Nothing is this subchapter shall apply to acts or practices authorized
under specific rules or regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion under Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C.A.
45(a)(1)]. The provisions of this subchapter do apply to any act or practice
prohibited or not specifically authorized by a rule or regulation of the Federal
Trade Commission. An act or practice is not specifically authorized if no rule or
regulation has been issued on the act or practice.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Nottingham v. General Am. Communications Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir.
1987); see Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 31 Sup. Ct. J. 47, 49 (Nov. 4, 1987) ("The
legislative history of the DTPA indicates that the Act was intended to apply to all service
providers.").
66. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 524 (July 1, 1987).
67. Id. at 524-25.
68. Id. at 526.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 525-26.
1988]
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burden of proof on this issue. 7 1
The justices disagreed on the nature of the standard of care implied in the
contract. 72 The majority found no distinction between the claims of failure
to perform in a good and workmanlike manner and negligent performance.
73
In a concurring opinion, Justice Spears argued that negligence and the fail-
ure to render services in a good and workmanlike manner were not necessar-
ily the same and that the former does not necessarily encompass the latter.74
Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes75 represents one of the most
important decisions handed down during the Survey period. The plaintiff,
Barnes, purchased a modular home from the defendant, Melody Home
Manufacturing Company. A faulty connection between the sink and drain
caused the home to have a continuous problem with dampness. The defend-
ant's employees attempted to repair the home on two occasions. Instead of
correcting the problem, however, the repairs caused additional damages.
The jury found that the defendants had failed to construct the home in a
good and workmanlike manner and, in addition, that the defendant had
breached an implied warranty to repair the home in a good and workman-
like manner. Furthermore, the jury found that Melody Home knowingly
breached the implied warranty and awarded discretionary damages under
the DTPA. On appeal Melody Home contended that a contractor's mere
provision of repair services does not give rise to an implied warranty that the
contractor will perform the services in a good and workmanlike manner.
The court of appeals held that the sale of a service created an implied war-
ranty.7 6 The Texas supreme court, in a more limited holding, held that
when one repairs existing tangible goods or property he creates an implied
warranty of good and workmanlike performance.7 7 In reaching this hold-
ing, the court concluded that the same policies that support the imposition
of strict products liability justified the protection of an implied warranty in
service transactions.7 8 The court reserved the question of whether a war-
71. Id. at 526.
72. Id. at 526-27.
73. Id. at 526.
74. Id. at 527. "An engineer could exercise due care, ordinary prudence, and perform
reasonably but, through mistake or ignorance, still render unskilled or shoddy services." Id.
75. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 47 (Nov. 4, 1987).
76. Id. at 48-49.
77. Id. The court's original opinion was reported at 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 489 (June 17,
1987). The court withdrew the opinion and replaced it with the rehearing opinion. 31 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. at 47. The court used more expansive language in the original opinion. In that
opinion the court recognized an "implied warranty that services will be performed in a good
and workmanlike manner". 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 490-91. The court emphasized in the second
opinion that "[we] do not require repairmen to guarantee the results of their work; we only
require that those who repair or modify existing tangible goods or property to perform those
services in a good and workmanlike manner. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 50. But see Bennett Coul-
son & CAE, Inc. v. Lake Utility Dist., 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 524, 526-27 (July 1, 1987) (draws
distinction between implied warranty of good and workmanlike manner and implied duty of
care: "[a]n engineer could exercise due care ... but through mistake or ignorance, still render
unskilled or shoddy services").
78. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 49. The court concluded that (1) the public interest in protect-
ing consumers exceeded the impact of the imposition of damages upon the provider of service,
(2) between the service provider and the consumer, the provider occupies a better position to
[Vol. 42
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ranty would be implied in transactions involving the rendition of profes-
sional services.79
Notably, the Melody Home majority held that a party could not waive or
disclaim the implied warranty in question. 0 The court reasoned that the
allowance of waivers or disclaimers would violate the very public policy that
supported the warranty's creation.a' To permit service providers to defeat
the consumer's expectation that work will be performed in a proper manner
would encourage shoddy workmanship.8 2 Justice Campbell concurred in
the judgment, but proposed that the court limit the warranty to manufactur-
ers who claim to correct a defect that existed when the consumer purchased
the product.8 3 Justice Gonzales filed a concurring opinion arguing that the
warranty should be nothing more than an extension of the implied warranty
that a builder will construct a home in a good and workmanlike manner. 84
In March v. Thiery85 the court considered whether the sale of an unfin-
ished home creates implied warranties of good workmanlike construction
and habitability.86 The court of appeals answered in the affirmative, holding
that the builder/vendor who constructs a residential building impliedly war-
rants that he performed the portion of work completed in a good and work-
manlike manner. 87 The court further held that the fact that the builder first
occupied or owned the home did not vitiate the implied warranty because
courts consider the warranty to be automatically assigned to subsequent
parties.88
In Mercedes-Benz of North America v. Dickinson89 the court of appeals
addressed the effectiveness of using a disclaimer to exclude express warran-
ties. The automobile sales contract contained a statement indicating that
neither the manufacturer nor the dealer made any express or implied war-
prevent the loss, (3) a consumer can rely upon the service provider's expertise, and (4) the
provider of services can better absorb the cost of damages resulting from substandard services.
Id.
79. Id. at 50. In its original opinion the majority held that the same policies supporting
imposition of an implied warranty for services such as repair also justified a warranty in the
rendition of professional services. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 491. The original opinion overruled
Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1985), which held to the contrary. Notably, the
Texas Supreme Court has granted writ in Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
206 (Feb. 10, 1988). In an unreported opinion, the Archibald court of appeals held that no
implied warranty of performance exists with respect to the rendition of professional services.
The Texas Supreme Court granted the writ on the following point of error: "The Court of
Appeals erred in holding that there is no implied warranty of good and workmanlike perform-
ance to the horse training services provided by Act III Arabians." Id.; cf Bennet Coulson &
CAE, Inc. v. Lake Utility Dist., 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 524, 526 (Spears, J., concurring).
80. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 492.
81. Id.; see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
82. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 50. The Melody Home decision also overruled part of GWL,
Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982), which limited the implied warranty for
services.
83. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 51 (Campbell, J., concurring).
84. Id. (Gonzales, J., concurring); see Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
85. 729 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
86. Id. at 892-93.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 892; see Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. 1983).
89. 720 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
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ranties, except as set forth in the printed Mercedes-Benz warranty, a copy of
which the dealer was to furnish to the purchaser upon delivery of the vehi-
cle. The warranty book indicated that the dealer made no warranty whatso-
ever. This statement contradicted the evidence and the jury's finding that
the dealer made express warranties to the purchaser. The court held the
manufacturer's and dealer's disclaimers ineffective, 90 pursuant to section
2.316 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code.91 The court termed the
disclaimers inoperative because they contradicted the dealer's express verbal
warranties. 92 The buyer's inability to read the manufacturer's warranty un-
til after signing the sales contract barred the disclaimer under section
2.316. 93
In Muss v. Mercedes-Benz of North America94 the court of appeals consid-
ered whether subpart b of section 2.725 of the Texas Business & Commerce
Code95 applied to a written manufacturer's warranty. Subpart b of section
2.725 provides that for purposes of the statute of limitations, a breach of
warranty occurs when the seller tenders delivery, unless the warranty ex-
tends to future performance of the goods.96 In Muss the manufacturer's
warning stated:
Any authorized Mercedes-Benz dealer of the owner's choice will, with-
out charge to the owner, perform warranty repairs made necessary be-
cause of defects in material or workmanship ... This warranty shall
remain in effect until the vehicle has accumulated 24 months or 24,000
miles of use, whichever first occurs . . .97
The plaintiff argued that the warranty extended to future performance of the
goods as provided in section 2.725(b). The court disagreed, holding that the
warranty assured the seller's future compliance to make repairs and did not
constitute a warranty regarding the goods' quality.98 Accordingly, the court
found the warranty in question did not qualify as a future performance
exception.99
90. Id. at 851.
91. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(a) (Vernon 1968). Section 2.316(a) provides:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limiting warranty shall be construed wherever rea-
sonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this chap-
ter on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2.202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
92. 720 S.W.2d at 852.
93. Id.
94. 734 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
95. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Vernon 1968). Section 2.725(b) provides:
(b) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends
to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
Id.
96. Id.
97. 734 S.W.2d at 157-58.





In Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital 100 patients sued a doctor
and a hospital for both negligence and deceptive trade practices. The jury
verdict contained findings supporting both theories of recovery. On appeal
the court considered whether to allow the plaintiffs to recover both exem-
plary damages for gross negligence and treble damages under the DTPA.
The Texas Supreme Court held that because the jury found that the decep-
tive conduct and the negligent conduct resulted in the same damages, an
award of both exemplary damages and statutory treble damages would con-
stitute an impermissible double recovery of punitive damages. 10 Accord-
ingly, the court permitted the plaintiffs to elect between the exemplary
damages and treble damages under the DTPA.10 2 Further, the court held
that the plaintiffs did not waive their entitlement to treble damages by failing
to make an election in the trial court.103 The court explained that when the
prevailing party does not elect a remedy, the trial court should render judg-
ment for those damages affording the greatest recovery.'°4
In Kold-Serve Corp v. Ward ' 05 the purchaser of an ice-making machine
sued the manufacturer because the machine did not perform as repre-
sented. 0 6 The court of appeals affirmed an award that included the sums of
money paid by the purchaser to the manufacturer and/or financing bank,
including interest on this indebtedness, the installation and startup expenses,
lost profits, and mental anguish.' 0 7 The court prohibited the manufacturer
from submitting damage issues to the jury for the value of the machines
because he failed to produce evidence of their value.' 0 8 Additionally, the
manufacturer failed to request a jury issue, which would have determined
this matter. In dicta the court held that, in a DTPA case, the plaintiff no
longer must prove the existence of a physical injury in order to recover for
mental anguish.' 0 9
100. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 36 (Oct. 28, 1987).
101. Id. at 40.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 39-40.
104. Id. The court relied upon TEX. R. Civ. P. 301, which requires a judgment to be "so
framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled." 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at
39. See also Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 811 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ) (plaintiff entitled to greatest relief that verdict allows).
105. 736 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ granted).
106. Id. at 754-55.
107. Id. at 755-56; cf Nottingham v. General Am. Communication Corp., 811 F.2d 873,
879 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff entitled to recover both damages and rescission of future obliga-
tion when necessary for full compensation).
108. 736 S.W.2d at 755.
109. Id. at 756. The Court relied upon St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649
(Tex. 1987), which held that plaintiff need not show a physical manifestation of mental
anguish in order to recover damages for mental anguish in a suit alleging a negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Apparently, the court determined that it need not restrict the rationale
of Garrard to negligence cases and that the rule should apply to DTPA suits as well. See,
Curry, Recovery of Damages and Restitution Under the DTPA, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, DE-




DTPA section 17.50(d)I 10 provides that a court shall award a prevailing
consumer reasonable and necessary attorney's fees.II' In March v. Thiery112
the court of appeals held that the consumer's attorney's testimony that he
had taken the case on a one-third contingent fee basis and that such a fee
arrangement was reasonable constituted sufficient evidence to support an
award of attorney's fees.1 13
A DTPA claim often arises in connection with other common law claims
or when a consumer defends a counterclaim asserted by the defendant. In
these situations, a court confronts the question whether the consumer must
segregate those attorney's fees attributable to a DTPA action and those at-
torney's fees expended in prosecuting the common law action or defending
against a counterclaim. In Wood v. Component Construction Corp. 114 the
court of appeals held that a consumer cannot recover attorney's fees under
the DTPA that are incurred in defending a counterclaim, unless the facts
necessary for the consumer to recover under the DTPA also serve to defeat
the counterclaim.' 15 The Wood court found that the facts supporting the
consumer's claim did not defeat the counterclaim asserted by the defend-
ant. 16 Accordingly, because the evidence did not distinguish between attor-
ney's fees incurred in the defense of the counterclaim and those incurred in
the prosecution of the DTPA claim, the award of attorney's fees could not
stand. 1 7 In contrast, in Nottingham v. General American Communications
Corp. 118 the Fifth Circuit did not require the trial court to allocate attorney's
fees between the various claims because essentially the same facts formed the
basis of the various causes of action and defenses. 119 In Homes Savings Asso-
ciation v. Guerra 120 the court held that the defendant must object at the trial
court level when the trial court submits a special issue to the jury regarding
attorney's fees for the entire case without requiring a separate allocation of
attorney's fees between claims or parties. 121 If the defendant fails to object
timely, he waives his objection. 122
The defendant can recover attorney's fees incurred in the defense of
groundless DTPA claims that the plaintiff brought in bad faith or for the
purpose of harassment. 123 In Intertex, Inc. v. Cowden 124 the jury found that
110. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
111. Id.
112. 729 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
113. Id. at 897.
114. 722 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
115. Id. at 445-46.
116. Id. at 444.
117. Id. at 444-45.
118. 811 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1987).
119. Id. at 880. Attorney's fees were properly awarded because the attorney's services were
required to successfully prosecute the DTPA claim. Id.
120. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 534, 536 (July 1, 1987).
121. Id. at 536.
122. Id.
123. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
124. 728 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
[Vol. 42
COMMERCIAL TORTS
the plaintiff brought the claim in bad faith and for the purpose of harass-
ment. The trial court also found the claim groundless, but refused to award
attorney's fees to the defendant.1 25 The court of appeals held that the statute
required the court to award the defendant attorney's fees when the court
found bad faith. 126 The plaintiff's decision to nonsuit its DTPA claim dur-
ing trial did not alter the defendant's right to recover attorney's fees. 1 27 Hill
v. Pierce 128 presented the converse situation. The Hill trial court found that
the plaintiff's claim was not groundless and that the plaintiff did not bring
the action in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.1 29 The court of
appeals held that the evidence supported these findings. 130 The court of ap-
peals stated that the term "groundless," as used in section 17.50(c), 3 1 means
more than that the consumer failed to prevail; the term means that the plain-
tiff lacked an "arguable basis for his cause of action."1 32 The terms "bad
faith" and "for the purpose of harassment" require a showing that the con-
sumer had a malicious or discriminatory purpose. 133 In this connection, a
reckless disregard for the rights of the defendant or the absence of a good
faith belief in the basis of his claim constitutes a showing of malice.1 34
F. Notice/Defenses
A consumer must give thirty days written notice to the defendant of his
specific complaints and the actual damages, expenses, and attorney's fees
claimed, before filing suit seeking the recovery of damages under the
DTPA.135 Several cases during the Survey period dealt with the application
of that provision. In McCann v. Brown 136 the court considered the suffi-
ciency of a demand letter. The applicable portion of the letter sent by coun-
sel for the plaintiff read as follows:
Your actions unquestionably constitute a violation of the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practice Act. They also constitute common law fraud. We
hereby give notice pursuant to those statutes and failure to deliver the
trailer which was purchased will result in us seeking our full legal dam-
125. Id. at 819-20.
126. Id.; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
127. 728 S.W.2d at 820.
128. 729 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
129. Id. at 341.
130. Id. at 341-42.
131. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
132. 729 S.W.2d at 341.
133. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
134. 729 S.W.2d at 341. In Zak v. Parks, 729 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ) the court stated in dicta, that the defendant need not prove malice, per-
sonal ill will, or reckless disregard in order to prove that the plaintiff brought the claim for the
purpose of harassment or in bad faith.
135. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988) states:
(a) As a prerequisite to filing a suit seeking damages under Subdivision (1) of
Subsection (b) of Section 17.50 of this subchapter against any person, a con-
sumer shall give written notice to the person at least 30 days before filing the suit
advising the person of the consumer's specific complaint and the amount of ac-
tual damages and expenses, including attorney's fees, if any, reasonably incurred
by the consumer in asserting the claim against the defendant.
136. 725 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Forth Worth 1987, no writ).
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ages including penalties, interest and attorney's fees. 137
The court determined that the letter satisfied the DTPA's notice require-
ment.' 38 The court noted that the letter clearly alerted the defendant to the
consumer's complaint and gave the defendant an opportunity to settle.1 39 In
contrast, the Fifth Circuit held in International Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow
Distributor 1 40 that the plaintiff had the burden of notifying the seller about
additional damages he discovered during the interim period between the
time when he sent the first notice letter and the time of the filing of the
lawsuit. 141 The court noted, that as a procedural matter, the proper remedy
for a plaintiff's failure to give the statutory notice is an abatement rather
than a dismissal.142 If the defendant, however, fails to specially except or
otherwise object to the plaintiff's failure to plead or prove the required no-
tice, the defendant waives the error and may not raise it for the first time on
appeal. 143
In MBank Fort Worth, N.A. v. Trans Meridian, Inc. 144 the court held that
when the parties maintain equal bargaining positions, the consumer, through
his conduct, may waive his assertion of rights under the DTPA. 145 The con-
sumer's waiver, however, must be knowing and intelligent, and his conduct
must be inconsistent with the assertion of his DTPA rights. 146 In MBank
the consumer possessed knowledge of the material facts concerning the de-
fendant's fraud at the time of the original transaction, but still entered into a
new contract based on the original transaction and otherwise took action
inconsistent with a repudiation of the original transaction. 47
137. Id. at 825.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 824-25.
140. 803 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1986).
141. Id. at 156.
142. Id.; accord The Moving Co. v. Whitten, 717 S.W.2d 117, 123 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. Challenge Transp., Inc. v. J-Gem Transp., Inc., 717 S.W.2d 115,. 117 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. 820 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1987).
145. Id. at 721-22.
146. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1988) provides: "Any
waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter is contrary to public policy and is
unenforceable and void .... "
147. 820 F.2d at 722. While the facts of the case may have supported common law waiver,
if the Fifth Circuit meant to allow waiver of DTPA rights, provided the conduct constituting
the waiver is both knowing and intelligent and not the result of unequal bargaining power, the
court appears to have argued in a circle. By definition, waiver requires a voluntary relinquish-
ment of known rights. Section 17.42 does not contain an exception for knowing, intelligent
and voluntary waivers. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
Perhaps the court meant that a consumer may waive his rights under the DTPA by certain
post-transaction conduct, undertaken after acquisition of knowledge of all of the facts, such as
in a settlement of a claim, or an in-court abandonment of certain rights. See Rocha v. U.S.
Homecraft Corp., 653 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Although the Fifth Circuit stated the facts sketchily, apparently the consumer, acting with
knowledge of the fraud, entered into a new contract with the defendant based upon the original
transaction. One could argue that the better analysis would focus on causation, rather than
waiver, and conclude that the defendant's conduct did not cause the consumer any damages





The Survey period contained several important cases dealing with causes
of action against an insurance company. The question of standing to bring
suit under Texas Insurance Code article 21.21148 arose in Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Marshall. 1 49 The plaintiff recovered a settlement in a worker's
compensation claim, which included, among other things, a provision re-
quiring Aetna to pay the plaintiff's future medical costs. The court's judg-
ment incorporated the settlement agreement. After the settlement, the
plaintiff encountered difficulties obtaining payments from Aetna for his med-
ical expenses and ultimately brought suit against the company. The plaintiff
alleged that Aetna violated DTPA section 17.46150 by representing to the
plaintiff that the agreed judgment contained medical benefits that it, in fact,
did not contain. Such a misrepresentation is actionable under article
21.21.151 The insurance company argued that Marshall did not have stand-
ing to bring the suit because he did not qualify as a consumer and because
the court's judgment did not constitute an insurance policy. The Texas
Supreme Court held that article 21.21 does not require Marshall to qualify
as a consumer.1 52 Marshall established a cause of action under article 21.21
by showing that the insurance carrier's actions violating DTPA section
17.46 injured him. 15 3
In a landmark case, Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance
Co.,154 the Texas Supreme Court considered the question whether an insurer
has a duty to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured. Arnold, the
insured, filed a claim on his uninsured motorist policy against National
County Mutual Fire Insurance Company (NCM). NCM denied Arnold's
timely demand for payment. After Arnold sued both the uninsured motorist
and NCM and obtained a judgment in the amount of approximately
$18,000, NCM paid the $10,000 policy limit. Arnold then filed suit against
NCM alleging that the company failed to act reasonably when it delayed
settlement of the claim and forced Arnold to file suit. The trial court
granted a summary judgment in favor of NCM, which the court of appeals
affirmed.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding
148. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
149. 724 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1987).
150. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
151. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981).
152. 724 S.W.2d at 772.
153. Id. The court stated:
Article 21.21 does not incorporate the entire [DTPA] which would require
proof that Marshall was a consumer of goods or services. Instead, article 21.21
provides a cause of action to a person who has been injured by an insurance
carrier who engages in an act proscribed by Section 17.46.
Aetna's contention that a judgment is not an insurance policy is likewise irrel-
evant. The question is simply whether Aetna engaged in conduct prohibited by
section 17.46.
Id.
154. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
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that due to the special relationship 55 between the insurance company and
the insured, the law imposes on the insurance company a duty of good faith
and fair dealing.' 56 The court held that Arnold stated a cause of action for
breach of this duty by alleging that the insurance company denied his claim
and delayed paying his claim without a reasonable basis. 157 Additionally,
the insurance company breached this duty by failing to determine whether
any reasonable basis for denial or delay existed.158 The court pointed out
that a plaintiff may recover mental anguish damages and exemplary damages
arising from breach of this duty on the same grounds that permit their re-
covery in other tort actions.159 Finally, the court held that the statute of
limitations on the cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing does not begin to run until the parties finally resolve the underly-
ing insurance contract claims.16°
Chitsey v. National Lloyds Insurance Co. 161 involved a claim that the in-
sured, Chitsey, had filed under his fire insurance policy. Chitsey alleged that
the insurance company had failed to properly evaluate and investigate his
claim and had therefore violated article 21.21 and breached the insurance
company's duty of good faith and fair dealing. First, the Texas Supreme
Court addressed Chitsey's claim under the Insurance Code.162 Chitsey al-
leged that the jury's finding that the insurance company had failed to use
due diligence in determining the amount of the plaintiff's loss established
that the insurance company violated a State Board of Insurance order. 63
The board order prohibits practices that constitute unfair methods of com-
petition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the insurance business, as
determined by law.' 64 The court rejected Chitsey's claim, holding that the
phrase determined by law in the board order refers to an agency or a legisla-
tive determination and that a jury finding, alone, does not constitute such a
155. The court found the special relationship due to "the parties' unequal bargaining power
and the nature of insurance contracts which would allow unscrupulous insurers to take advan-
tage of their insured's misfortunes in bargaining for settlement or resolution of claims." Id. at
167. The court noted that an insurance company has exclusive control over the claims pro-
cess, thereby permitting a company to deny coverage arbitrarily and delay payment with the
only penalty being interest in the money owed. Id.
156. Id. The court thus extended the duty first recognized in G.A. Stowers Furniture Co.
v. American Indemnity Co., 155 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding ap-
proved). The court distinguished the duty of good faith that arises from the parties' special
relationship from a covenant of good faith, which the court had previously refused to imply
into every contract. Id. See English v. Fisher, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).
157. 725 S.W.2d at 167.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 168.
160. Id. In a footnote, however, the court stated that this holding did not mean that the
court may not try contract claims and claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing together whenever possible. Id. at 168 n. 1.
161. 738 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1987).
162. Id. at 642-43; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
163. Docket No. 41060, State Board of Insurance, Amendment of Unfair Competition and
Unfair Practices of Insurers Rules (June 4, 1982).
164. Id. State Board of Insurance Order No. 41060 provides, in part, that "no person shall
engage in this State in any trade practice which is determined pursuant by [sic] law to be an
unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insur-
ance." Id.; cited in 738 S.W.2d at 643.
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determination. 165 The court, however, did hold that based upon an affirma-
tive jury finding, Chitsey could recover for the insurance company's breach
of its duty of good faith and fair dealing in handling the claim. 166
In Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Guin 167 the Texas Supreme
Court considered application of the Stowers doctrine. 168 In Stowers the
court held that an insurer owes its insured the duty of reasonable care. 169
Accordingly, a court will hold an insurer liable for refusing to accept a
claimant's settlement offer if an ordinary, prudent person standing in the
insured's situation would have accepted the offer. 170 The jury in Ranger
County found that the insurance company negligently handled both the
claim and the lawsuit asserted against its insured.' 7 1 The insurance com-
pany contended that the special issue was overly broad and that Stowers
obligated the company only to accept an unconditional settlement within the
policy limits. The Texas Supreme Court refused to adopt this limited ap-
proach. 172 The court held that the insurer's duty extends to the same
breadth as the agency relationship and includes not only settlement matters,
but the investigation, preparation, and trial of a lawsuit. 173 The court ex-
plained that the insurer's failure to offer to settle within policy limits (in the
face of probable liability in excess of the policy) and the insurer's failure to
advise the insured of a settlement offer supported a finding of negligence in
the company's handling of the lawsuit.' 74 The court approved the trial
court's lengthy jury instructions concerning an insurer's duty. 75 Finally,
the court held that the evidence supported a finding of gross negligence,
which authorized the award of punitive damages.' 76 Justice Gonzales dis-
sented, asserting that the court could not properly extend liability under
Stowers for negligence other than a failure to settle a claim within the policy
165. 738 S.W.2d at 643-44. Chitsey could have avoided this limitation by bringing suit
under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988) for violation of TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 3 (Vernon 1981). Section 3 provides: "No person shall engage
in this state in any trade practice which is defined in this Act as, or determined pursuant to this
Act to be, an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the
business of insurance." Id. A jury finding that the insurance company had engaged in an
unfair act would constitute a determination pursuant to art. 21.21. Cf Spradling v. Williams,
566 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. 1978) (jury finding necessary in order to find deceptiveness of un-
listed conduct prohibited by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a)).
The Chitsey court rejected the plaintiff's contention that he established a violation of an-
other board order, incorporated by reference in Board Order 41060. While the court acknowl-
edged that such a cause of action exists, it held that Chitsey's evidence did not establish proof
of a violation. 738 SW.2d at 643-44.
166. 730 S.W.2d at 643-44 (citing Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725
S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987)).
167. 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
168. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved).
169. Id. at 547.
170. Id.
171. 723 S.W.2d at 658.
172. Id. at 659.
173. Id.
174. Id.





In Block v. Employers Casualty Co. 178 the court addressed the question of
whether an insurance company may attack a judgment, agreed to by its in-
sured in settlement of a claim, after the insurance company failed to defend
the insured. In Block the plaintiff sued the insured, Coating Specialists, Inc.
(CSI), for defects in a roof that CSI installed on his home. After CSI's insur-
ance company refused to defend CSI, contending that the damaging event
had not occurred during the policy period, CSI and the plaintiff entered into
an agreed judgment. The court of appeals held that if the insurance com-
pany wrongfully refused to defend its insured, the insurance company could
not collaterally attack the final agreed judgment between its insured and the
claimant.1 79 The insurance company, therefore, could not challenge either
the reasonableness of the damages awarded by the agreed judgment or reci-
tations in the judgment setting the date of the loss within the policy
period. 180
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed and held that while the insurance
company could not relitigate the reasonableness of the damages set forth in
the judgment,18 1 the recitation that the damaging event occurred within the
policy period did not bind the insurance company.' 8 2 The court reasoned
that the agreed judgment did not establish the policy coverage; therefore,
CSI's assertion that no coverage existed did not constitute a collateral attack
on the agreed judgment. 83 In addition, CSI was not collaterally estopped
from contesting the date of the loss because the date of the loss did not
constitute a material issue in the agreed judgment and because CSI's inter-
ests were antagonistic to those of the insured's on this issue.184 The Texas
Supreme Court also determined that rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 85 did not require the insurance company to plead specifically that
the policy did not cover the loss. 186 Instead, the insurance company ade-
quately raised this issue, the court held, by a general denial since proof of the
date of loss is a prerequisite of coverage.' 87 Because the evidence clearly
showed that the loss occurred within the policy period, however, the court
affirmed the lower court's judgment for the insureds.188
Chaffin v. Transamerica Insurance Co. 189 raised a question of first impres-
sion: Does an insurance company's wrongful denial of coverage under the
177. Id. (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
178. 723 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
179. Id. at 174.
180. Id.
181. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 245, 246 (Feb. 24, 1988) (citing Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530
S.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Rahn,




185. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
186. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 247.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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tortfeasor's policy give a third party a cause of action against the tortfeasor's
insurance company? The plaintiffs sued the subcontractor responsible for
waterproofing the roofs on two townhomes. Due to the subcontractor's neg-
ligence, both properties sustained damage. The subcontractor admitted lia-
bility and informed its insurance carrier, Transamerica, of its liability.
Without investigating the merits of the claim, Transamerica denied the
claim, asserting that the policy did not cover the subcontractor for these
damages. Ultimately, Transamerica admitted that it previously denied cov-
erage without basis and, approximately three years from the date of the loss,
paid the plaintiffs the subcontractor's policy's limits. The plaintiffs dis-
missed their suit against the subcontractor, but continued their suit against
Transamerica for tortious handling of the property claim. They contended
that Transamerica's actions caused them unnecessary litigation expenses in
their suit against the subcontractor. Among their claims, the plaintiffs as-
serted a cause of action pursuant to section 16(a) of article 21.21 of the
Texas Insurance Code. 190 That section gives a cause of action to persons
injured by others engaged in proscribed practices. 19 1 The plaintiffs asserted
that the term "person" in section 16 included third parties injured by an
insurance company's misconduct. Although acknowledging that the plain-
tiff's construction of this term lent credence to their position, the court nev-
ertheless refused to recognize a statutory action by a third party against an
insurance carrier. 192 In rejecting this cause of action, the court relied upon
the common law rule that an insured party may not bring a direct action
against his tortfeasor's insurance carrier. 193 The court further held that
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover under a common law duty of good
faith and fair dealing because the duty extends only from the insurer to its
insured and does not provide a remedy for an injured third party. 194
III. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AND BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT
In Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. 195 the Texas Supreme
Court provided an interesting discussion of the causes of action for business
190. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon 1981).
191. Section 16.(a) provides:
Any person who has sustained actual damages as a result of another's engag-
ing in an act or practice declared in Section 4 of this Article or in rules or
regulations lawfully adopted by the Board under this Article to be unfair meth-
ods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of
insurance or in any practice defined by Section 17.46 of the Business & Com-
merce Code, as amended, as an unlawful deceptive trade practice may maintain
an action against the person or persons engaging in such acts or practices.
Id.
192. 731 S.W.2d at 732.
193. Id. at 731-32; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 51(b). One could argue that the authorities cited by
the court do not compel the court's holding. The court failed to state why, as a matter of
statutory construction, the claimants did not fit within the definition of persons empowered by
section 16 to bring suit for conduct actionable under Art. 21.21. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981).
194. 731 S.W.2d at 732. This holding appears defensible due to the absence of a special
relationship between the insurance company and a third party.
195. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 144 (Dec. 16, 1987).
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disparagement and tortious interference with contract. The case involved a
suit by two former insurance agents against their former employer, Gulf At-
lantic Insurance Company, to recover damages incurred as a result of the
defendant's misrepresentation that the agents were authorized to write group
health insurance underwritten by Gulf Atlantic. After the agents sold the
insurance, the defendant told state officials investigating the sales that the
agents were not in fact authorized to write the insurance. The absence of
authorization resulted in the agents' arrests and the loss of their insurance
licenses, among other damages.
The court, pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
623A, 196 held that the elements of a cause of action for business disparage-
ment consist of the defendant's publication of the disparaging words, falsity,
malice, lack of privilege, and special damages.197 The court recognized that
business disparagement resembles defamation, but noted that defamation
protects the injured party's personal reputation whereas business disparage-
ment protects the injured party's economic interests.' 98 Business disparage-
ment requires proof of special damages in the form of pecuniary losses, such
as loss of sales. 199 In the case at bar, plaintiffs were unable to show direct
pecuniary loss as a result of the defendant's conduct. 2° ° Accordingly, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove a business dis-
paragement claim.20 ' The court also held that plaintiffs failed to show tor-
tious interference with the contract because the only contract affected was
the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant.20 2 The court held the
defendant's failure to honor its agreement with the plaintiffs may have con-
stituted breach of contract and even fraud, but would not support a claim for
tortious interference with a contract. 20 3 In Tinkle v. McGraw2° 4 the federal
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977).
197. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 147; cf Donaldson v. Lake Vista Community Imp. Ass'n, 718
S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that actionable inter-
ference with business relationship arises when defendant commits "an intentional harmful act
without legal justification").
198. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 147. The court cited other differences. First, the law presumes a
defamatory statement to be false-truth is a defense; a party bringing a claim for business
disparagement must prove the falsity of the statement. Second, a party who defames another is
strictly liable, whereas scienter is an element of a cause of action for disparagement. Third,
proof of special damages is only required in certain defamation cases; proof of pecuniary loss is





203. Id. at 143. The court also discussed the defendant's contention that the disparaging
statements were privileged because they were made to an assistant attorney general who was
investigating the insurance program. The court drew a distinction between an absolute privi-
lege, which functions as a complete immunity regardless of the motivation of the speaker, and
a conditional or qualified privilege, which protects the speaker only when it is made for a
proper purpose. Id. The court held that the communication to the assistant attorney general
would give rise to, at most, a conditional privilege. Id. Because proof of a business disparage-
ment incorporates proof of scienter on the part of the defendant, a plaintiff who establishes his
cause of action, therefore, defeats a qualified privilege. Cf City of Brady v. Bennie, 735
S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Eastland, 1987, no writ) (holding that only qualified privilege avail-
able in suits for tortious interference).
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district court considered whether the defendant's interference in the contract
between two other parties was privileged and, therefore, not a tortious inter-
ference. 20 5 The plaintiff alleged contractual interference against Kip Lamb,
an attorney, based on Lamb's recommendation to his mother, Melba Lamb,
and her sisters not to sign certain documents pursuant to a contract. The
court held that Texas law recognizes that one who stands in a confidential
relationship with a party to a contract may induce that party to breach a
contract. 206 The court concluded that the defendant's familial and profes-
sional relationship with the other parties to the contract bestowed upon him
a privilege to advise them concerning the wisdom of signing the documents
in question. 20 7
Baker v. WelCh208 presented an unusual claim for tortious interference
with a business relationship. Plaintiff operated a lounge on property it leased
from a corporation, Houston Helicopters, Inc. (HHI). The defendant,
Baker, was the founder, sole shareholder, and president of HHI. After a
verbal disagreement, Baker notified the plaintiff that HHI had decided to
terminate the lease, as the contract permitted. Welch alleged that this termi-
nation constituted a tortious interference by Baker with plaintiff's relation-
ship with Baker's corporation. The court of appeals rejected this mind-
bending allegation, reasoning that Baker's and HHI's interests were so
closely intertwined that one could not interfere with the conduct of the
other. 209 The court also held that interference with contractual business re-
lations becomes privileged when it results from the exercise of a party's own
rights. 210
In First National Bank of Eagle Pass v. Levine211 the Texas Supreme
Court held that suits for tortious interference with business relations resem-
ble trespass actions,212 as section 16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code defines trespass.213 As such, the two-year statute of limita-
tions applies to such causes of action. 214
204. 644 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
205. The court stated that under Texas law the following elements constitute a cause of
action for contractual interference: (1) the existence of a contract, (2) willful and intentional
interference with that contract, and (3) proximate cause between the interference and actual
damage or loss to the plaintiff. Id. at 139.
206. Id. at 140.
207. Id.
208. 735 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ dism'd).
209. Id. at 549-50.
210. Id.
211. 721 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1986).
212. Id. at 289.
213. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986). This section provides
in pertinent part: "There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause
of action shall have accrued, and not afterward, all actions or suits in court of the following
description: 1. Actions of trespass for injury done to the estate or property of another." Id.
§ 16.003(1).
214. 721 S.W.2d at 289; cf Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Estate of Slick, 386 S.W.2d
180 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964.)
, 
writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam 403 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.




In National Mortgage Corp. of America v. Stephens215 the court consid-
ered whether the failure to pay the proceeds of a check gives rise to a conver-
sion action. The plaintiff purchased a mobile home and executed an
installment contract. The mobile home dealer assigned the contract to the
defendant, National Mortgage Corporation. A fire caused extensive damage
to the mobile home and to the plaintiff's personal possessions. The insur-
ance company issued a check for approximately $27,000. A portion of the
check covered the loss of the home and the balance covered the plaintiff's
personal property. The plaintiff alleged that National Mortgage agreed to
reimburse her for the value of her personal items, if she signed the entire
check over to them. Although the plaintiff endorsed the check, National
Mortgage applied all but a small portion of the check to the outstanding
indebtedness on the home. The plaintiff brought suit for conversion of that
portion of the insurance proceeds representing reimbursement for her per-
sonal property. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the plaintiff
and awarded her the proceeds at issue. The case continued when the plain-
tiff entered a claim for punitive damages based on National Mortgage's
wrongful withholding of the insurance proceeds and a claim for actual dam-
ages caused by National Mortgage's delay in transferring title to the home.
The plaintiff recovered a final judgment when the jury rendered a favorable
verdict.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's summary judgment deci-
sion.216 The court reasoned that the check's proceeds could not form the
subject of a conversion action because a conversion action is not available for
the recovery of money, unless the money can be identified specifically as a
chattel. 217 The insurance company did not owe the plaintiff a specific sum of
money, but rather a portion of the insurance company's bank account after
having deposited the endorsed check. The plaintiff's voluntary endorsement
and delivery of the check negated any claim that National Mortgage had
converted the draft itself.21 8 The court held that the plaintiff did not have a
cause of action in tort, but merely a cause of action for money had and
received. 219 Such a cause of action for the breach of an implied contractual
obligation did not support an exemplary damages award. 220 In International
Nickel Co. v. Trammel-Crow Distribution221 the Fifth Circuit addressed
whether a warehouseman's failure to deliver stored goods to their owner
creates a rebuttable presumption that the warehouseman has converted the
215. 723 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-El Paso (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 735 S.W.2d 474
(Tex. 1987).
216. Id. at 762.
217. Id. at 761.
218. Id. at 761-62.
219. Id. at 762.
220. Id. Possibly, Stephens also would have had causes of action for the torts of deceit,
generally referred to as "fraud," negligent misrepresentation, and deceptive trade practices
arising out of the misrepresentation that induced her to sign the check. Id.
221. 803 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1986).
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goods. Under Texas law, a bailee's failure to return goods to their owner
gives rise to a presumption of the bailee's negligence. 222 Noting that other
jurisdictions were split on this question and that no Texas court had appar-
ently addressed this question, the court refused to extend the presumption to
include conversion, as well as negligence. 22 3
V. FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
In Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene National Bank 224 the defendant bank is-
sued a letter of credit to Fina Supply, Inc. (Fina) as part of an oil exchange
agreement between Fina and a third party, Brio Petroleum, Inc. The letter
of credit assured Fina that it would receive payment for excess shipments of
oil made to Brio. The bank extended the expiration date of the letter of
credit on several occasions. The question arose as to whether this extension
merely gave Fina additional time to make proper presentation in conformity
with the letter of credit, or whether it extended the letter of credit's coverage
to include transactions that occurred at a later time. Fina alleged that an
agent of Abilene National Bank represented that the amendments to the let-
ter of credit covered further exchange and balances. The court, however,
held that extension of the expiration date merely extended the time to com-
ply with the terms of the letter of credit and did not cover additional
imbalances. 225
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's ruling that the
bank's agent's misrepresentations did not amount to actionable fraud. 22 6
The court reasoned that the representations concerned the legal effect of
amendments to the document. Because the law considers such representa-
tions statements of opinion, not of fact, the representations generally do not
support an action for fraud. 227 Relying upon the leading case in the area,
Safety Casualty Co. v. McGee,2 28 the court noted that the exceptions to the
general rule include the following fact situations: (1) when one party with
superior knowledge deceives another party, who is ignorant of the law,
through studied concealment or misrepresentation; (2) when a fiduciary or
confidential relationship exists between the parties; and (3) when the misrep-
resentation of law was intended and understood as a representation of
fact.229 In the present case the court found none of the exceptions to ap-
222. See Buchanan v. Byrd, 519 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1975).
223. 803 F.2d at 154.
224. 726 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. 1987).
225. Id. at 539. The court relied upon Westwind Exploration, Inc. v. Homestate Savings
Ass'n, 696 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985).
226. 726 S.W.2d at 540-41.
227. Id.
228. 133 Tex. 233, 127 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Comm. App. 1939, opinion adopted).
229. Id. Other exceptions exist to the general rule that opinions are not actionable at com-
mon law. Indeed, in Safety Casualty Co. v. McGee the court stated that "so harsh a rule...
ought to be modified in its application by every exception which can be admitted without
defeating its policy." Id. at 177. In Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1983),
the court listed the following exceptions to the general rule: (1) when the speaker has knowl-
edge of its falsity, (2) when the speaker purports to have special knowledge of what will occur
in the future, and (3) when the opinion is based upon past or present facts. Of course, the
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ply.230 The court found the parties equally sophisticated, no confidential
relationship between the two parties, and no superior knowledge on the part
of the defendant concerning the law.23' The court held it could not apply
the third exception, statements of opinion intended and understood as state-
ments of fact, to a situation in which the parties maintained equal bargaining
positions and could obtain equal access to legal advice.232 In such a situa-
tion the parties could draw their own conclusions as to the legal effect of
their conduct. 23 3
In Geosearch, Inc. v. Howell Petroleum Corp. 234 the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the proper construction of section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 235 which imposes liability for negligent misrepresentations. For the
past fifteen years, several courts of appeals have followed section 552 when
deciding negligent misrepresentation cases. 236 In Geosearch Howell Petro-
leum Corp. (Howell) granted Geosearch, Inc. (Geosearch) a working inter-
est in an oil well. The agreement signed by the parties did not require
Howell to insure Geosearch's interest. A Howell employee, however, stated
during a telephone conversation following the signing of the agreement that
Howell carried insurance that covered Geosearch's interest. The well suf-
DTPA provides a statutory cause of action for misrepresentation of the legal effect of docu-
ments. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Section
17.46(b)(12) prohibits "representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or
obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law." Id.
230. 726 S.W.2d at 540-41.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. The court unjustifiably rejected the third exception. If the party giving an opinion
intends the statement to be treated as a statement of fact and the other party understands it to
be one of fact, the court should not insist upon treating it as one of opinion, regardless of the
parties' bargaining positions.
234. 819 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1987).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). Section 552 reads as follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false infor-
mation for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (I) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient in-
tends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty
is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
Id.
236. See, e.g., Blue Bell v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court directly referenced section 552); Great American
Mortgage Investors v. Louisville Title Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court looked to section 552 for explanation of negligent misrep-
resentation); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court quoted section 552 as the general rule).
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fered an underground blowout, which, it turns out, was not covered by in-
surance. Geosearch brought suit for, among other things, negligent
misrepresentation. Geosearch recovered judgment in the lower court based
upon a favorable jury verdict. On appeal the court considered whether
Howell supplied false information for the guidance of another under subsec-
tion (1) of section 552. Howell argued that Geosearch must prove that
Howell had a pecuniary interest in Geosearch's purchase of insurance and
that an interest in the well did not constitute such a pecuniary interest. In a
well-reasoned opinion the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument.237 The court
declined to draw an "artificial line" separating the purchase of insurance
covering the well from the rest of the transaction and held that, for purposes
of section 552, the drilling venture necessitated the purchase of insurance.
238
Houston Title Co. v. Ojeda De Toca 239 examined the effect that recording
information in the Real Property Records has upon the seller's duty to dis-
close that information to the buyer. This lawsuit arose out of Mrs. Toca's
purchase on November 15, 1979, of a residence in Houston. When the
plaintiff purchased the property, she did not know that Harris County had
condemned the property. An outstanding order of a Harris County building
official authorized the City of Houston to demolish the property. Plaintiff, a
resident of Mexico, parked her car in the garage after closing on the property
and then returned to Mexico. The city demolished the house on March 10,
1980, but the plaintiff did not find out until she returned in July of 1980.
Mrs. Toca brought suit against the title company and the seller and recov-
ered a jury verdict. The jury found that the title company's and the seller's
failure to disclose the demolition order constituted both negligence and a
deceptive trade practice. Further, the jury found that the seller's failure to
disclose the demolition order constituted fraud.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment against the title company,
holding that a title company (as opposed to an abstract company) does not
owe its insured a duty to disclose outstanding encumbrances. 240 The court
held that the title company only owed a duty to the insured to indemnify
against the losses resulting from outstanding encumbrances or defects in the
title.241 The court followed Texas law reflected in earlier courts of appeals'
opinions. 242 The court next considered the defendant's argument that the
recorded condemnation order created a defense to the claims of violations of
the DTPA and fraud.243 The court determined that the recordation consti-
237. 819 F.2d at 526.
238. Id.
239. 733 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ granted).
240. Id. at 327.
241. Id.
242. Id.; see also Prendergast v. Southern Title Guaranty Co., 454 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (guaranty company owed no duty to
purchaser to examine title to land); Wolff v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 565,
569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (insurance company did not have to
point out encumbrances on land to purchaser).
243. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.002 (Vernon 1984). Section 13.002 provides: "An
instrument that is properly recorded in the proper county is notice to all persons of the exist-
ence of the instrument." Id.
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tuted a defense to the plaintiff's claims that the defendant failed to disclose
the order.244 Recordation, pursuant to section 13.002,245 constitutes con-
structive notice of the order.2 46
This holding merits reexamination in light of the recordation statute's
purpose. The recordation statute permits a party to stake a claim to a piece
of real property, putting the world on notice that he has an interest in that
property and thereby preventing one who would otherwise be a bona fide
purchaser from obtaining that status.247 A party therefore cannot defeat
another party's property interest by claiming ignorance of that party's inter-
est. Yet, Houston Title Co. and the prior cases on point 248 treat section
13.002 as a substitute for full disclosure in a transaction. The court can
engage in the fiction that a party has knowledge of those title facts recorded
in the deed records when necessary to protect other parties who rightfully
claim an interest in the property. A court, however, should not invoke this
fiction for the purpose of relieving a seller of the duty of disclosing clearly
material information, such as that he does not own that which he purports
to convey. The court in Houston Title Co. appears to go even further by
charging a purchaser with notice of filed documents that do not, at the time
of purchase, affect the title to the property.2 4 9 Ironically, one of the cases
cited by the court, NRC, Inc. v. Pickhardt,2 50 although agreeing with the
proposition that a purchaser is charged with actual notice of matters affect-
ing its title, held that a seller nevertheless has a duty to disclose facts which
do not affect title.251 Such facts include the suitability of the property for its
intended use. 252 The court's decision in Houston Title charging the pur-
244. 733 S.W.2d at 327-28.
245. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.002 (Vernon 1984).
246. Id.
247. See Boucher v. Wallis, 236 S.W.2d 519, 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
248. Medalion Homes, Inc. v. Therman Inv., Inc., 698 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); Jernigan v. Page, 662 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Medalion the court stated, in dicta, that the absence of
ownership as evidenced in real property records creates a defense to breach of an implied
warranty of good title. 698 S.W.2d at 403. In Jernigan, upon which Medalion relied, the
defendant sold certain real property to the Wendells who sold the property by contract for
deed to the plaintiffs. When the Wendells defaulted on their loan, the defendant foreclosed on
the property and sought to oust the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged several unconvincing vio-
lations of the DTPA on the part of the defendants. The trial court directed a verdict against
plaintiffs. 662 S.W.2d at 761. The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs were not deceived
by defendant and that they were charged with notice of the defendant's interest in the property
by virtue of the recorded deed of trust. Id. at 762.
249. Houston Title Co. v. Ojeda De Toca, 733 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, writ granted). The order of the building official posted the house as a dan-
gerous building and set a February 10, 1979, deadline for submission of repair plans. The
director of public works authorized the City of Houston to demolish the building after this
date and place a lien on the property for demolition costs. Since the city did not demolish the
house until after the purchase, the city apparently did not file the lien until after the purchase
as well.
250. 667 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
251. Id. at 294; see also Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 657-
58 (Tex. 1979) (limiting notice to defects affecting marketable title).
252. 667 S.W.2d at 294.
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chaser with notice of a demolition order extends an already questionable rule
and turns the recordation statute into an instrument of fraud. The recorda-
tion statute does not substitute for the full disclosure necessary to honest
transactions. This statute should not relieve a seller from disclosing to the
buyer material facts (including facts affecting title) of which the seller has
actual acknowledge. 253
253. Cf Morris v. Brown, 85 S.W. 1015, 1017 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, writ ref'd) (purchaser
entitled to rely upon representation of good title; no legal duty to search records).
1988]

